

LSE Summer week

2022

Day 1

Présenté par: Pierre Parrend, Professeur HDR

Laboratoire Systèmes de l'EPITA (Kremlin-Bicêtre)/ICube (Strasbourg)

Enseignant à l'EPITA Strasbourg

Thanks to organizers!

- Marc, Fabrice, and all others !



Trusted AI for secure critical systems

A dark blue background featuring a complex, glowing blue network of interconnected dots and lines, resembling a digital or neural network.

Présenté par: Pierre Parrend, Professeur HDR
Laboratoire Systèmes de l'EPITA (Kremlin-Bicêtre)/ICube (Strasbourg)
Enseignant à l'EPITA Strasbourg

LSE – some piece of news



07/07/2022 4



LSE Summer week 2022

When?	Who	What?
10h	Pierre Parrend	Trusted AI for secure critical systems
10h45	Grégory Blanc	Generating synthetic traffic to improve the robustness of network intrusion detection
11h15	Julius Pfrommer	Industrial Communication with OPC UA – Secure by Design?
11h45	Mark Angustures	Port scans and DDos detection by time series filtering
12h30 - pause		
14h	Chistian Elloh	Anonymisation of DNS requests through blockchain
14h45	Badis Hammi	Is it really easy to detect sybil attacks in C-ITS ?
15h30	Mohammed Badredine Zouhair	Malwares
16h15	Laurent Beaudoin, Loïca Avanthey	Cartography of submarine zones with lightweight means


Thursday, 7/7/22

Who	What?
Marc Espie	To cache or not to cache, making pkg_add faster
Martin Grenouilloux	Discovering new ways of attacking AES when trying to do something else
Alex Levigoureux, Antoine Jouan	Work on UEFI driver rootkit with a bare metal hypervisor
Younes Benreguieg	Metrics for graph-based Anomaly Detection
Darius Engler	Writing a bare metal GPU driver for the Raspberry PI 4

Saturday, 9/7/22
TO be finalized




A brief history of LSE



Security-Systems Team




Team members




Doctorants: Amani Abou Rida, Julien Michel (, Majed Jaber + YOU)

Younes Benreguieg, Antoine Jouan, Nabih Benazzouz, Sébastien Delsart, Alexis Ehret, Thomas Berlioz, Daniel Frederic, Leo Benito, Mathieu Fourre, Alex Levigoureux, Alexandre Fresnais, Martin Grenouilloux, Pierre-Emmanuel Patry, Cesar Belley, Esteban Blanc, Arthur Cohen, Tanguy Dubroca, Martin Schmidt

Scientific goals – 2022



The SOC cybersecurity use case



Software

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	Total
Research				2	2	2 CREA, Cybergraphe
Open Source	2	2	2	2	1	2 Glibc; OpenBSD
➤ Commit	915	488	209	179	134	OpenBSD (Marc is 1 of 3 main contributors)
Google Summer of Code	2		2			4 libvirt, Vulkan, gcc-rs, Radare2
Student projects	9	many	many	many	3	
POCs				1	2	3
EPITA Infrastructure	2	2	2	2		2 Moulinette; infra ACUs
C <small>TF</small> LSE	1	1	1 07/07/2022	1 11	1	1
Total	7	5	7	8	7	14





Detection




07/07/2022 13




The adversary

- Example Multi-step Attack
 - Dataset DARPA 2000

LLDoS 2.0.2



1-dimension



Training duration:16.657758951187134


N-dimensions

Error-based features separate out genuine and fraudulent transactions


N dimensions

Classification as prediction oracle

- XGBoost
- MLP – Multi-layer processing
- ...




Limitations




AI and critical systems

What is Trusted IA ?





Human oversight




Visualisation of data



Visualisation of model




Towards explainability



Arrieta, Alejandro Barredo, et al. "Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI): Concepts, taxonomies, opportunities and challenges toward responsible AI." *Information fusion* 58 (2020): 82-115.

The challenge: getting accuracy and interpretability back together




Trusted graphs

From ML to Graph learning

Euclidean domains


1,.., n dimensional

Machine learning-based network anomaly detection methods such as one-class support vector machines (OSVM), autoencoders (AE) , and isolation forests (IS).



Non-Euclidean domains

Graph learning such as graph analysis, graph embedding, graph neural network



Expectations



Traceability: graph nodes can support data embedding.
Interactions are visible!



Transparency: most graph algos are intrinsically transparent
(not all)



Comprehensibility: output is typically a graph part (not always)




Explainability: making interactive graph plots is straightforward




Interpretability: see all previous points

Explainability in graph models




Machine learning with graphs 1/3


First order search



The Cybergraph tool: low hanging fruits



The Cybergraph tool



The screenshot shows a web-based interface for the Cybergraph tool. At the top, there's a browser header with icons and the URL "localhost:5000/graph_attack". Below it is a navigation bar with tabs: "Attack Detector", "Home", "Visualization", and "Graph attack". The main area displays a network graph. Nodes are represented by yellow circles, and edges are blue arrows. The graph consists of several nodes connected by edges, with labels indicating "ATTACK" and specific IP addresses such as 192.168.100.147, 192.168.100.150, 192.168.100.3, 192.168.100.7, 192.168.100.5, 192.168.100.6, and 192.168.100.148. Some nodes also have "ATTACK" labels above them. To the right of the graph, there is a large amount of Python code:

```
#SCAN TCP
SET scan_detection_tcp TO defaultdict(list) #source,dst -> list port
SET scan_detection_tcp_result TO list()

#SCAN TCP DETECTION
IF row[PROTO_INDEX] EQUALS "tcp" and row[FLAG_INDEX] EQUALS "RST":
    IF len(scan_detection_tcp[row[IPSRC_INDEX]+","+row[IPDST_INDEX]]) >= SCAN_TCP_THRESHOLD:
        IF row[IPSRC_INDEX]+","+row[IPDST_INDEX] not IN scan_detection_tcp_result:
            scan_detection_tcp_result.append(row[IPSRC_INDEX]+","+row[IPDST_INDEX])

        ELSEIF row[IPSRC_INDEX]+","+row[IPDST_INDEX] not IN scan_detection_tcp and
row[IPDST_INDEX]+","+row[IPSRC_INDEX] not IN scan_detection_tcp:
            scan_detection_tcp[row[IPSRC_INDEX]+","+row[IPDST_INDEX]].append(row[PORTDST_INDEX])

        ELSE:
            IF row[PORTDST_INDEX] not IN scan_detection_tcp[row[IPSRC_INDEX]+","+row[IPDST_INDEX]] and
row[IPDST_INDEX]+","+row[IPSRC_INDEX] not IN scan_detection_tcp:
                scan_detection_tcp[row[IPSRC_INDEX]+","+row[IPDST_INDEX]].append(row[PORTDST_INDEX])
```

Attacks table x +

127.0.0.1:5000/attacks_table


Cybergraph Visualization Attacks graph Attacks table CASG Import Dynamic Graph Dynamic Analysis

Select database : botiot Scan TCP Scan UDP DoS DDoS MITM Island Hopping Update

Current database in use : botiot

IP source	IP destination	Attack(s)
192.168.100.150	192.168.100.5	['SCAN_TCP']
192.168.100.150	192.168.100.7	['SCAN_UDP', 'SCAN_TCP']
192.168.100.150	192.168.100.6	['SCAN_UDP', 'SCAN_TCP']
192.168.100.150	192.168.100.3	['SCAN_UDP', 'SCAN_TCP']
192.168.100.149	192.168.100.6	['SCAN_UDP', 'SCAN_TCP']
192.168.100.149	192.168.100.3	['SCAN_UDP', 'SCAN_TCP']
192.168.100.149	192.168.100.7	['SCAN_UDP', 'SCAN_TCP']
192.168.100.149	192.168.100.5	['SCAN_TCP']
192.168.100.148	192.168.100.7	['SCAN_UDP', 'SCAN_TCP']
192.168.100.148	192.168.100.5	['SCAN_TCP']
192.168.100.148	192.168.100.3	['SCAN_UDP', 'SCAN_TCP']
192.168.100.147	192.168.100.5	['SCAN_TCP']
192.168.100.147	192.168.100.7	['SCAN_UDP', 'SCAN_TCP']
192.168.100.147	192.168.100.3	['SCAN_UDP', 'SCAN_TCP']
192.168.100.6	192.168.100.147	['SCAN_TCP']
192.168.100.6	192.168.100.148	['SCAN_TCP']

Node behaviour analytics



Machine learning with graphs 2/3

Graph features, Euclidian ML



Some graph metrics: communities

- Density d

$$0 \leq d \leq 1$$

Rate of number of connections between nodes in a community wrt number of possible connections number of connections


- Externality e

$$0 \leq e \leq 1$$

Rate of edges with 1 end node not in the **C1** community and 1 in **C1** wrt. the total number of edges having at least 1 end node in **C1**

Example:

Community **C**




$$d = 2/3$$

- 2 connections in **C** (1,2) and (1,3)
- 3 possible connections (1,2), (1,3) et (2,3)

Example:



Community **C1**



$$e = 0,5$$


- 2 edges with end node outside **C1** (3,4) et (2,5)
- 4 edges with at least 1 node in **C1** (1,2), (1,3) et (2,3)

Benchmarking learning incl extracted graph features



Machine learning with graphs 3/3

Graph learning



Metrics for evaluating explainability

- Fidelity

difference of accuracy between the original predictions and the new predictions after masking out important input features

$$Fidelity = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N (f(G_i)_{y_i} - f(G_i^{(1-m_i)})_{y_i})$$

$$Infidelity = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N (f(G_i)_{y_i} - f(G_i^{(m_i)})_{y_i})$$


- Sparsity

the fraction of features selected as important by explanation methods


$$Sparsity = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \left(1 - \frac{|m_i|}{|M_i|}\right)$$

Machine learning with graphs


Summary



Future challenges



Next application domains



XDGMed – Medical IoT

Correau – Industrial systems
- water distribution



le cnam



This is a call for PhD Students ...



And future interns !



Merci !!

